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FROM DARKNESS INTO LIGHT? 
REFLECTIONS ON WANDERING IN DARKNESS
DAVID MCNAUGHTON
Florida State University
eleonore Stump’s Wandering in Darkness is a  magnificent achievement. 
It combines the acuity and rigor of analytic philosophy with a deeply and 
richly imaginative approach to the interpretation of literary (and especially 
biblical) texts, and to our understanding of human nature. There is much 
here with which I agree and such criticisms as I offer mainly take the form of 
friendly amendments. Given the length and complexity of the book I have 
had to ignore many issues altogether, and also to omit many subtleties in 
her discussion of those issues with which I do engage. In particular, I much 
regret not having space to discuss her illuminating remarks about the role 
of stories in what she dubs ‘Franciscan’ knowledge, and her penetrating 
and stimulating application of these ideas to biblical exegesis. I begin with 
some questions about the general nature of her project.
DeFeNCe AND THeoDICY
How are we to reconcile the goodness of God with the reality of 
suffering? Stump draws a distinction, initially introduced by Plantinga, 
between a defence and a theodicy. on her account, a ‘defense describes 
a possible world that contains God and suffering and that is similar to 
the actual  world, at least in the sense that it contains human beings, 
natural laws, and evils much like those in our world; and then the 
defense proposes a morally sufficient reason for God’s allowing evil in 
such a possible world’ (p. 19).1 A defence does not claim that the possible 
world just described is the actual world, whereas a theodicy does. Stump 
1 All otherwise unidentified page references are to eleonore Stump, Wandering in 
Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (oxford: oxford university Press, 2010).
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claims that what she is offering in this book is ‘strictly speaking’ a defence 
rather than a theodicy (p. 19). Her strategy is to take Aquinas’s theodicy 
– his understanding of how the world is, including God’s role in allowing 
suffering – and offer it merely as a defence. on this understanding of 
the two terms, ‘nothing in a defense rules out someone’s accepting the 
defense as a theodicy.’ (Indeed, I suspect she thinks Aquinas’s view does 
describe the actual world.)
The terms ‘defence’ and ‘theodicy’ are used in rather different ways 
by different writers in response to rather different challenges. Her 
explanation of how she is using the terms left me rather unclear as 
to her overall strategy. I think that is because she sometimes appeals to 
criteria appropriate to one kind of defence when the context suggests 
she has a different kind of defence in mind. I begin by mapping various 
possibilities, and then suggest what seems to me the most plausible 
interpretation of Stump’s enterprise.
What is a defence, and what would constitute a successful one? The 
answer depends on the nature of the attack. Plantinga popularized 
the notion of a defence, when he offered the free-will defence in response 
to  the logical problem of evil put forward by, among others, John 
mackie. To refute mackie’s claim that the existence of evil is logically 
incompatible with the existence of God, the theist does not have to 
produce a theodicy; i.e. tell us what God’s actual reason is for permitting 
evil. All the defender has to do is to describe some possible world in which 
there is reason for a good God to permit evil. It does not even matter, for 
these purposes, whether it is likely or plausible that this possible world 
is the actual one; the defender can engage in whatever metaphysically 
extravagant speculations he wishes. And Plantinga does so engage, one 
might think, in his postulation of trans-world depravity.2 maybe each 
creaturely essence would go wrong on some occasion in every possible 
world in which it exists, but that postulate looks remarkably ad hoc. This, 
of course, is not a defect in a defence against the logical problem of evil, 
since any coherent story, however unlikely, will suffice to show that no 
contradiction is involved in the co-existence of a good God and evil.
What has come to be known as the evidential problem of evil is both 
more challenging and more interesting. The evidentialist claims that the 
specific nature of evil in our world makes theism unlikely. There is only 
2 And, perhaps, in his postulation of very powerful evil spirits.
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morally sufficient reason for any agent to bring about or allow an evil 
if two things are true. First, that the evil was the only means available 
to bring about some greater good (i.e. it was a necessary evil); second, 
that the evil is such that an agent would be justified in allowing it to 
bring about that good (call this an acceptable evil). The evidentialist 
may concede that the theist can explain why God would allow some bad 
things, but denies that there is a plausible theistic explanation of all the 
evil there is – perhaps because there is too much evil, or evils that no-one 
can explain, or evils so dreadful that no good being would bring them 
into existence. The existence of apparently gratuitous evils – ones that are 
unnecessary or unacceptable (or both) – nevertheless constitutes good 
evidence that God does not exist.
Van Inwagen has suggested that the strategy of defence can be extended 
against the evidential argument.3 He, like Plantinga, distinguishes 
between theodicy and defence, but his account of the distinction differs 
from Plantinga’s. Van Inwagen’s take on the evidential argument is along 
the following lines.4 let ‘S’ stand for a  fairly detailed description of 
suffering in our world. Now consider two hypotheses. The first is  that 
neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings is the result 
of non-human actions. Call this naturalism. The other hypothesis is 
theism. The evidential argument claims that S is not at all epistemically 
surprising, given naturalism, but it is very surprising given theism. So 
we have good prima facie reason to prefer naturalism to theism. How to 
meet this challenge? The theist might argue that S is much less surprising 
(because more probable), given theism, than one might suppose. This is 
the strategy that Van Inwagen labels theodicy, and here his usage differs 
from that of Plantinga and Stump. Van Inwagen thinks the prospects 
for theodicy are bleak and so proposes to adapt Plantinga’s notion of 
a defence in order to defend theism. Suppose one were in no ‘position 
to assign any epistemic probability to S on theism ... then ... one is not 
in a position to say that the epistemic probability of S on [naturalism] 
is higher than the probability of S on theism’.5 Given that degree of 
ignorance, S would not be surprising on theism – not because S was just 
what one would expect, but because one had no idea what to expect if 
3 Peter van Inwagen, ‘The Problem of evil, The Problem of Air, and the Problem of 
Silence’, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 5, Philosophy of Religion (1991), pp. 135-165.
4 I have shortened and altered it in ways that I hope do not distort it.
5 Peter van Inwagen, ‘The Problem of evil, The Problem of Air, and the Problem of 
Silence’, pp. 140-141.
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theism were true. There are thus two ways, on his view, in which some 
occurrence can be epistemically unsurprising. It can be what one would 
expect, given the evidence, or it can be not unexpected, only because one 
has no idea what to expect.
A  defence against the evidentialist, for van Inwagen, is ‘a  story 
according to which God and suffering of the sort contained in the actual 
world both exist, and which is such that (given the existence of God) 
there is no reason to think that it is false, a story that is not surprising on 
the hypothesis that God exists’.6 There is, remember, no reason to think 
it false, because we have no way of assessing its likelihood. What use 
is a defence of this kind? Van Inwagen offers a quasi-judicial analogy: 
suppose Jane wishes to defend the character of richard III; how will 
she deal with evidence that suggest he murdered the princes in the 
tower? She may offer a story that accounts for all the evidence, on which 
richard did not do the dastardly deed. To succeed, she does not have to 
show that this is what (probably) happened. Her line of defence will be 
successful if her auditors think ‘For all I  know, that’s true. I  shouldn’t 
be at all surprised if that is how things happened’.7
In her opening chapter, Stump draws on both Plantinga and van 
Inwagen in setting out her position. Yet, I  suspect, she is not engaged 
in the same enterprise as either of them. I  don’t think she is merely 
addressing the logical problem, for at least two reasons. First, she 
points out, rightly, that ‘such a  claim is much harder to support than 
its proponents originally supposed’ (p. 3). Second, the logical problem 
claims that, if God exists, there cannot be any suffering, a claim I doubt 
any opponent of theism would now make. Stump’s concern is with the 
amount and depth of the suffering we find in our world. That suggests 
she is addressing the evidential problem.
I also doubt, however, that her strategy is the same as van Inwagen’s, 
although she appeals to his account of Jane’s defence of richard III in 
setting up her own case. His defence depends on claiming that we can 
assign no epistemic probability (high, low, or middling) to S, given 
theism. To make out that case, he appeals to the depth of our ignorance at 
a number of points, including large dollops of moral and modal ignorance. 
but Stump rejects ‘skeptical theism’ which rests on such assertions as 
that we ‘cannot evaluate the intricacies of probabilistic reasoning or 
6 Ibid., p. 141.
7 Ibid., p. 142.
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cannot calculate complicated modal claims’ (p. 14).8 I  think, therefore, 
that Stump is addressing the evidential problem of evil, but is offering 
something more substantial than the sort of defence van Inwagen has in 
mind. She is not simply claiming that we have no idea whether to expect 
suffering, given theism. rather, she offers an account in which, given 
certain plausible claims about God’s nature and purposes, we should 
expect God to allow the kind of suffering (of adult human beings) that 
we find in our world.
While, as I understand her, Stump wants her account to be plausible, 
she does not claim that it is true (since that would involve showing, 
among other things, that there is a God). How might describing a merely 
possible world meet the evidentialist challenge? Here is an analogy. 
Consider a  biologist who thinks that evolution by natural selection 
is a  well-supported theory. In response to the objection that some 
biological trait or characteristic appears to be inexplicable on his theory, 
he may offer one or more explanations of how the attribute in question 
could have evolved. even though he lacks evidence to show that the trait 
did evolve in one of the ways he suggests, his defence will be acceptable 
if his explanations of how it might have done so are plausible. And 
they will be plausible if, given what we now reasonably believe, one of 
these explanations might very well be true. The biologist’s speculations 
are stronger than a  defence in van Inwagen’s sense. He is not merely 
claiming that the adaptation is not unexpected since, in the depths of our 
ignorance, we have no idea what to expect. rather, he is trying to show 
that such an adaptation is just what we would expect, given the truth of 
evolution, while acknowledging that he is not in a position to assert that 
his story of how the adaptation arose is in fact the correct one. I suggest 
this model as the best way of interpreting Stump’s enterprise.
unsurprisingly, I  do not have a  complete account of what makes 
a  theory plausible, but I  take it that it should not resort to ad hoc or 
unsupported assumptions or postulations, and it should cohere well with 
a large part of those of our beliefs that are well-supported. In the body 
of her book, Stump makes strenuous efforts to meet this standard. For 
example, in chapter 15, she goes to considerable lengths to support the 
claim that ‘suffering enables [the sufferer] to grow in psychic integration’. 
She offers detailed evidence, not only from our own experience and that 
of others, but also from scientific investigations of the topic (pp. 458-460). 
8 She cites van Inwagen’s article, among others, in a footnote at this point.
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Her practice, then, strongly supports the view that what she is offering 
is a  theodicy, rather than just a  defence, in van Inwagen’s sense.9 (To 
avoid confusion, I shall, however, continue to follow her usage and talk 
of her ‘defence’. It is the nature of her strategy that we need to clarify; the 
nomenclature is fairly unimportant.)
I  labour this point because, although in building her case Stump 
tries to make her explanation of God’s allowing suffering as plausible as 
possible, when she explicitly states her criteria for an adequate defence, 
she puts the epistemic bar far too low. of the worldview she has just 
been laying out in great detail she writes: ‘because it is a defence and not 
a theodicy, it needs only to be internally consistent and not incompatible 
with uncontested empirical evidence’ (p. 452). This standard would 
be acceptable if she were addressing only the logical problem. but as 
a  response to the evidential problem it is woefully inadequate.10 It is 
so minimal that any competent conspiracy theorist, biblical literalist, 
philosopher, or paranoid schizophrenic, asked to defend his crazy views, 
might well spin a yarn that will pass it.11 I conclude that she understates 
both what she needs to do, and what she actually accomplishes; her own 
account of what she is doing may lead the unwary reader into thinking 
that her project is less ambitious (and hence less interesting) than it 
actually is.12 How well, then, does it succeed?
 9 on van Inwagen’s account, the theodicist argues as follows (where h is whatever 
auxiliary hypothesis the theist uses to explain suffering): ‘The truth of [h] is just what one 
would expect given theism, and S is just what one would expect (would not be all that 
surprising) given theism. And, therefore, we do not have a prima facie reason to prefer 
[naturalism] to theism, and the evidential argument from evil fails.’ ibid., p. 139. other 
writers offer similar accounts of the distinction. For example: ‘A theodicy is intended to be 
a plausible or reasonable explanation as to why God permits evil. A defense, by contrast, 
is only intended as a possible explanation as to why God permits evil.’ (Nick Trakakis, 
‘The evidential Problem of evil’ in the Internet encyclopedia of Philosophy, <http://
www.iep.utm.edu/evil-evi/#H3> [accessed 3/9/2012]. Since writing this paper, I  have 
found that michael Tooley makes similar distinctions in his piece on the topic in the 
Stanford encyclopedia (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/> [accessed 3/17/2012]).
10 How inadequate will depend, of course, on how we interpret ‘uncontested’. I leave 
that aside here.
11 I am reminded of a remark once made by a philosopher about some of his less stable 
colleagues: ‘Crazy logicians are impeccable reasoners when it comes to what follows from 
what. The problem arises when they begin with a faulty premiss – such as “Aliens are 
attempting to control me via my TV”.’
12 my fellow-symposiast at the Pacific APA, John martin Fischer, raises similar worries 
about the precise nature of Stump’s enterprise in his comments on Stump’s book.
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morAl ADeQuACY
Clearly, any defence of God’s allowing suffering will have to be morally 
plausible. In this respect, Stump’s defence does very well indeed. most, 
perhaps all, defences justify suffering by appeal to a  greater good and 
Stump’s is no exception. However, most popular theodicies or defences 
try to justify the suffering of some people by appeal to a greater benefit 
given to others. but whether that is a sufficient moral justification is hotly 
contested; aren’t (some of) those who suffer being used (in a  morally 
objectionable way) for the benefit of others, or to increase the overall 
good? (Call this the using objection.) It is one of the great merits of Stump’s 
defence that it avoids this difficulty by insisting that, for suffering to be 
justified, it must be a necessary means to a greater benefit for the person 
whose suffering it is.13 or, more accurately (since whether we receive the 
benefit is up to us, as well as to God) the suffering must make available to 
the sufferer a good that, were she fully to understand what she was being 
given, she would be willing to trade her suffering to receive (e.g. p. 375).
of course, it is open to those whose defence is subject to the using 
objection to argue that God is not doing anything morally objectionable 
on their account. even supposing they could make a  reasonable case, 
I think Stump’s account would retain two advantages. First, unlike a using 
account, it avoids appeal to controversial moral claims, and that increases 
its plausibility. Second, even if one thinks it would be acceptable for God 
to use some for the benefit of others, one can surely agree that it would be 
morally preferable if God could achieve these great goods without using 
anyone. It comports much better with the Christian conviction that God 
cares for each creature as well as for the good of the whole.
Stump draws on Aquinas’s work to show how God might achieve this 
goal.14 For Aquinas, love requires two interconnected desires: the desire 
for the good of the beloved, and the desire for union with the beloved 
(p. 91). Someone who lacks psychic integration cannot be close to others, 
and so be fully united to them in love (p. 125). According to Aquinas, 
‘an agent can be internally integrated only around the morally good.’ 
(p. 138) but our condition is such (as a result of the Fall) that we cannot 
13 Stump does not explicitly consider the merits of her explanation compared with 
others, but she does, on occasion, draw a  sharp contrast between her view and that 
of others (e.g. p. 408).
14 To say that, in this brief survey, I am leaving much out would be an understatement. 
but space does not permit.
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on our own achieve this integration and so be in a position to be united 
with God in love, which is by far the greatest good for humans (p. 387). 
Suffering will be justified if it is needed to ward off the worst thing, which 
would be to lose the opportunity to be united with God. For Aquinas, 
suffering can be medicine for the soul, purging sin and bringing us to 
humility (p.  398). Finally, union with God comes in degrees, and the 
further suffering of someone who has turned to God can make that 
person closer to God, and also make him more glorious – an inspiration 
to others (p. 401).15 To this, Stump adds a  further proviso. one who 
suffers often loses what is most precious in her eyes. A good God would 
not only ensure that that her suffering led to a great good for her, but 
would want to restore to her what she most desired (the ‘desires of her 
heart’), though not, perhaps, in their original form. ‘They can be lost in 
one way and gained in another way, much more deeply desired by that 
particular person.’ (p. 449)
Perhaps the clearest and simplest example that she cites of having the 
desires of one’s heart met in an unanticipated way is the case of Victor 
Klemperer, whose ambition to write his magnum opus on eighteenth 
Century French literature was thwarted when the Nazis came to 
power. However, he wrote a  diary of his experiences in prison which 
was published after his death, and which is now hailed as an important 
masterpiece. So he did achieve his literary ambitions after all.
of the many concerns one might raise about her account, I mention 
only two.
Trouble DoWN THe roAD?
Stump says, quite rightly, that in assessing the adequacy of the Christian 
response to the problem of suffering, we have to take as given, for the 
purposes of discussion, the Christian world-view. moreover, a defence 
‘does not seek to establish the existence of God or to argue for the truth 
of a particular set of religious beliefs’ (p. 415). True, but Christians do 
wish (and need) to defend the rationality of their beliefs as a whole, and 
a defence that dealt adequately with the problem of suffering would form 
an important plank in an evidential case for the existence of God. The 
worry I have is that, the more we require God to do in order for Him 
to be justified in allowing suffering, the less probable it may be that the 
15 The detailed account of how suffering can plausibly be supposed to achieve these 
ends is too complex even to summarize here.
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amount and kind of suffering we find in the world is compatible with 
the goodness of God. let me explain. Suppose Stump is correct. That 
is, that ‘God is justified in allowing human beings to endure suffering 
... because, through their suffering, and only by its means, God gives 
to each of the protagonists something that these sufferers are willing 
to trade their suffering to receive, once they understand the nature of 
what they are being given’, where that must include restoring the lost 
desires of their hearts in some form that makes what they get back more 
valuable than what they lost (p. 375). Stump rightly draws our attention 
to the ‘stunning nature of this claim’ (p. 375). It certainly demands more 
of God’s providential grace than do some of the other solutions to the 
problem of suffering. To achieve this goal, God is going to have his work 
cut out. omnipotent though he is, he can only bring about the logically 
possible, and we may wonder whether, for some cases of suffering, it 
really makes sense to suppose that the desires of each person’s heart 
can be restored, even in a post-mortem existence, especially when one 
considers how specific such desires can be.
Stump’s way of meeting this difficulty, as we have seen, is to allow 
some flexibility in what counts as getting the desires of one’s heart. each 
sufferer may not receive back what he specifically desired in the first 
place. Klemperer does not get to write his great book; he gets to write 
a different great book. Ironically, one of the themes of his diary is that 
he has been prevented from writing his magnum opus. but Klemperer 
may not be the best judge of such matters; Stump claims that ‘there is no 
transparency as regards flourishing, or one’s heart’s desires’ (p. 13). So 
Klemperer may, after all, have achieved his heart’s desire and could have 
been (or can be, in a post-mortem existence) brought to see this. (And it 
might be part of God’s mercy to enable him to see this.)
Perhaps this response of Stump’s works best where what is desired 
are states of affairs. I may want to live in the hills of the North, but what 
I may really want, unknown to me, is to be close to the maker of those 
hills.16 I  find it harder to see how it would work if the desire of one’s 
heart involved love for a particular person. Suppose you have one child, 
whom you love deeply. The child goes to the bad and rejects not only 
your love, but God’s also. Assuming the child never repents, the rift in 
your relationship will be permanent. In that case, the longed-for union 
16 This kind of experience is a major theme in C. S. lewis’s autobiography Surprised by 
Joy (london: Collins, 1965).
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with your child is forever beyond your reach. Not even God can restore it. 
God can remove your child’s freedom and force him to love you but what 
he cannot do, of course, is to make the child freely return your love. And 
only the child’s freely reciprocating your love can satisfy this particular 
desire of the heart. Stump has suggested to me (in correspondence) that 
in such a  case you would cease to desire union and your love would 
alter its nature so that it became merely a desire for your child’s welfare. 
I  don’t think this answers the worry for two reasons. First, though 
I might sensibly give up hoping that my child will have a change of heart, 
my deepest desire has not been satisfied. union with my child was and 
remains what I most want, though I recognize its unattainability. Second, 
if my child has irrevocably rejected both good and God, then my desire 
for his welfare is also frustrated.
I think there is a general point here. In any world in which agents have 
freedom and people have a deep love for others there is the possibility 
that there will be irrevocable disappointment of people’s deepest desires. 
Freedom entails that people can reject the love on offer, and that must 
lead to the frustration of the desires of those who love them. If we can 
make sense of God having desires of the heart, and I think we can, then 
plausibly one of these will be a desire that all his creatures should freely 
respond to his love.17 Since some may nevertheless reject him, then even 
God will suffer uncompensated loss.
I  hope it is by now clear how raising the bar for what God would 
have to bring about to justify his allowing suffering may also make it 
harder to believe that there really is a  good God. Consider agnostic 
maria who finds the problem of suffering the chief stumbling block to 
Christian belief. If it were not for that problem, she would think it more 
probable than not that God exists to a degree that would make her adopt 
theism. As it is, she thinks that, because of the problem of suffering, the 
evidence is too equally balanced to warrant a move to either theism or 
atheism. She is familiar with some solutions to this problem, in which 
God uses the suffering of some to bring about the greater good. She has 
no problem in seeing how God could achieve such good ends; what she 
doubts is whether the proffered explanation is sufficient to vindicate 
his goodness, since it seems to involve using others. Suppose she now 
reads Wandering in Darkness, and for the first time finds a solution that 
17 ‘o Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you who kill the prophets and stone those sent to you, how 
often I have longed to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under 
her wings, but you were not willing!’ (luke 13:34; see also matt. 23:37).
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is morally satisfying. If there is a good God, he should care for each of 
his creatures individually in the way Stump describes. If things were 
as Stump says they might be, then God would be justified in allowing 
the amount and kind of suffering we find in the world. but now a new 
doubt assails her. How can even God bring it about that no person ever 
permanently loses what is of deep importance to her? She acknowledges, 
of course, that God may do this in many cases, as Stump so movingly 
shows in her case studies. but, as we have seen, it does not seem to make 
sense in every kind of case.18 So maria has reason to doubt that God 
could have so organized the world that no one ever permanently loses 
their heart’s desire. And that lowers her (reasonable) estimate of the 
probability that God exists, and so she remains agnostic.19
AN ePISTemIC CIrCle?
So far I have acknowledged that someone in maria’s position might have 
good grounds for accepting Stump’s solution as a morally satisfying one. 
each sufferer will, as a result of their suffering, achieve a good for which, 
if they were reasonable, they would willingly accept that suffering. The 
central good (leaving to one side the issue of satisfying the desires of each 
heart) that suffering can bring, on Aquinas’s and Stump’s picture, is closer 
union with God. but now I  wish to raise an epistemic problem about 
whether an agnostic, like maria, can have good grounds for believing that 
such union would be a great good, and so sufficient to justify the suffering. 
let us accept that union with the creator and ruler of the universe, if he 
were perfectly good, would be such a good. but union with the creator and 
ruler of the universe would not be so good if he were morally flawed; if he 
were jealous, vengeful, capricious, callous, or just indifferent to suffering. 
I should stress that there is no metaphysical problem here: the universe 
could be as Aquinas describes it. but I think maria, and other agnostics 
like her, are faced with an epistemic circle, since the problem of evil raises 
precisely the issue of whether the ruler of the universe, if he exists, is 
wholly good. She would have grounds for believing that the ruler of the 
18 Stump rightly says that no defence or theodicy can tell us what specifically justifies 
each particular case of suffering, since we do not know enough of that person’s story; we 
can only give a generic account. but if Stump is right, there must be some such story for 
each person (as indeed she insists).
19 Put in van Inwagen’s terms: Stump may have raised the probability of S, given God, 
but lowered the probability of God, given S. I am grateful to Piers rawling for pressing 
this objection on me.
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universe is wholly good if she had grounds for believing that the ruler 
gives each sufferer a benefit that outweighs the suffering. Since, however, 
the good the sufferer is said to obtain is union with that ruler, she cannot 
have grounds for believing the benefit is sufficiently good unless she 
has grounds for believing he is good. And she cannot have grounds for 
believing he is wholly good unless she has grounds for believing that the 
benefit is sufficiently great to justify the suffering.20
one possible response to this worry is to claim that defences are 
meant to address only theists. The sole purpose of a defence is to show 
that theists are within their epistemic rights in believing in God. Defences 
are not meant to give any grounds for belief to non-believers. but that 
would seem an unduly narrow view of one’s audience. Since solving the 
problem of evil removes one barrier to showing that the theist’s belief in 
God is rationally defensible, one might also hope that it would enable 
belief in those whose way to belief is currently blocked by that barrier. 
but, if I am right, it seems that it cannot do so without circularity.
Is there any solution – any way in for the agnostic that avoids the 
circle? An epistemic solution would supply independent grounds for 
believing that God is good.21 Here is a suggestion as to how that might 
work; it draws to some extent on a  hugely important part of Stump’s 
book that I have not yet discussed. This is the possibility of what she calls 
Franciscan knowledge; knowledge which is not reducible to knowledge 
that, i.e. propositional knowledge. examples might include knowing 
colours, music, faces, etc. Such knowledge, though not reducible to 
propositional knowledge, can form the basis for propositional knowledge. 
An important aspect of Franciscan knowledge is knowledge of persons, 
knowledge we can only gain by personal interaction. one important 
aspect of such knowledge, I am going to suggest, is that one can have 
good grounds for believing something about a person, believing that he 
is kind or sincere on the basis of meeting him in person, even if that 
acquaintance is short, so that one cannot point to any evidence other 
20 I  have used the phrase ‘ruler of the universe’ to avoid the objection that God, 
by his very nature, is essentially good, in which case the proposition, ‘God is good’, is 
necessarily true.
21 There is an alternative pragmatic solution, of the sort advocated by William James, 
namely that it might not only be legitimate but prudent for the agnostic to begin to 
practice what the religion preaches in order to discover if there is truth in it. As Hugh 
mcCann strikingly put it in discussion: ‘if there might be gold in these hills, it would be 
sensible to start digging.’
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than the overall impression he made. one’s knowledge of the person, 
which cannot be fully communicated to those who have not met him, 
would be the basis for this piece of propositional knowledge. 
A famous parable by basil mitchell illustrates this.22 Suppose you are 
fighting with the partisans against the occupying forces. one night you 
meet a man who tells you he is a partisan leader, but who warns you that, 
in order to remain undetected, his behaviour will have to be ambiguous. 
Though you have met him only once, you find him utterly trustworthy. 
His behaviour is indeed ambiguous; sometimes he is seen helping 
partisans, but sometimes he appears to cooperate with the occupiers. 
other people, who have not met him, are sceptical. How can we know if 
he is really on our side? You, however, having met him, continue to trust, 
in virtue of that personal experience, and you are justified in so doing.
Stump considers four biblical narratives in which she illustrates how 
suffering can be redeemed. In three of them – Job, Abraham, and mary 
of bethany – a central issue is trust. one main point of the suffering of 
each of these people is to test and strengthen their trust in God, so as 
to enable closer union with him. It is essential to such tests, of course, 
that God’s behaviour is perplexing; if those tested knew what was going 
on, it would not be the same sort of test. Take Job. Job’s beef with God 
concerns God’s justice; how can a good God let him suffer in this way? 
When he meets God, God tells Job that he has a caring relationship with 
all his creation, but cites no evidence for these claims. Nevertheless, Job 
is convinced. Why? one answer would be that when he meets God face 
to face he knows that God is caring and trustworthy though, as Stump 
remarks, ‘[h]ow Job knows ... that his suffering is at the hands of a good 
and loving God ... is hard to explain to someone who was not part of the 
same second-person experience.’ (p. 224)
How might this get the agnostic out of the epistemic circle? If the 
agnostic could have a personal experience of God, then she might find 
him to be wholly good. Since this encounter gives her good reason to 
trust that God is good, then she can justifiably see union with him as 
a supreme good for her. In the words of the Psalmist, ‘o taste and see that 
the lorD is good: blessed is the man that trusteth in him.’ (Psalm 34:8)23
22 basil mitchell, ‘Theology and Falsification’ in A. Flew and A. macIntyre (eds), New 
Essays in Philosophical Theology (london: SCm Press, 1955), pp. 104-8.
23 I am grateful to a number of people for helpful comments on earlier drafts: Justin 
Capes, randy Clarke, matt Flummer, eve Garrard, ben Kimmell, brian leftow, Hugh 
mcCann, Al mele, Dan miller, Jay Quigley, Piers rawling, and Tina Talsma.
